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Financing the Small Firm Start-Up: 
Determinants of Debt Use
Frederick C. Scherr 
Timothy F. Sugrue 
Janice B. M^rd
While academic research concerning capital structure of large corporations has 
been abundant in the finance literature, studies of small firms have been some­
what less common, and investigation of capital structure at origin (start-up) has 
been virtually nil. In this paper we present empirical evidence concerning the 
start-up capital structures of small firms. We base this investigation upon char­
acteristics of both owner and firm. We find the percent of the owner's income 
expected to be derived from the business to be positively associated with debt 
use and the owner's age to be negatively associated with debt use. We find that 
more debt is obtained if the business owner is married and less if he or she is 
black. Similarly, more debt is prevalent among start-up firms in transportation 
and utilities than those in other industries. When debt obtained from other than 
financial institutions is considered, factors such as gender, experience, educa­
tion, and expected firm size also play a role in the structure o f start-up capital.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the theoretical and empirical study of the capital structures of large 
firms has a long history, the capital structure decisions of small firms have 
received a good deal less attention. Pettit and Singer [31] suggest that the 
capital structure of the small firm is determined in part by the interaction 
of the owner's risk-return preferences, the characteristics of the firm, and 
the costs of various types of financing. They see agency problems and a high 
level of asymmetric information as major determinants of financing costs.
This paper presents an empirical investigation of the initial (start-up) 
capital structures of small firms. Section II discusses the owner's risk-return
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preferences, the costs of various types of financing, and the business's char­
acteristics as determinants of these capital structures. Section III reviews 
prior empirical studies in the area. Section IV presents our research hypoth­
eses and methodology. Section V presents our empirical results. Section VI 
summarizes our findings and suggests areas for future research.
II. DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
FOR SMALL FIRMS 
The Owner's Risk-Return Preferences
Owners of small businesses can, to some extent, implement their own 
risk-return preferences in choosing the firm's capital structure. Whereas the 
small business literature frequently characterizes small business owners as 
being less risk averse than others [31], there may be portfolio consider­
ations which encourage them to be more risk averse.^ Specifically, the busi­
ness usually comprises a relatively large fraction of the owner's wealth so 
that the owner is under-diversified, forcing relatively conservative decisions 
in asset selection and financial structure [3]. The net effects of risk aversion 
and diversification will, in part, determine the owner's preference with 
regard to financial and operating risk.
The Costs of Financing
There are several reasons why suppliers of capital may require higher 
returns from smaller firms. First, small firms may in fact be more risky than 
larger firms. There are several reasons for this. The small firm's owner/man­
ager may be less risk-averse than managers of larger firms, and conse­
quently may select more risky projects [31]. Also, the owner/manager is 
generally a specialist in one facet of the firm (often its products or services), 
with less interest and ability in other critical areas. Finally, small firms, par­
ticularly those in high-technology product lines, deal in a limited number 
of new products or services for which there may be no accepted market 
niche.
Second, even if a small firm's actual risk is the same as that of a larger 
firm, suppliers of capital may demand higher required returns because of 
the higher estimation risk in forecasting expected return and risk. The 
value of the human capital (a critical determinant of small business success) 
is not easily observed, particularly for the first-time business owner [20, 
31].^ Further, audited reports and data from commercial reporting agencies 
on smaller firms are frequently unavailable or limited.
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Finally, there is substantial reason to believe that agency problems 
between suppliers of outside capital and the owner/manager are greater for 
small than for large firms. In general, small firms have more flexibility in 
altering their financial and operating structures and are more difficult to 
monitor [31]. Also, as majority owners, owner/managers face greater incen­
tives to alter the structure of the firm in favor of themselves at the expense 
of outside suppliers of capital. Suppliers of outside capital must build all of 
these factors into their required returns.^
The Firm's Business Characteristics
As for large firms, the characteristics of the small firm's business line 
and its asset structure will, in part, determine capital structure. For exam­
ple, firms with more securable assets and firms with lower investment in 
research and development will be able to obtain debt on more favorable 
terms, resulting in a tendency to use more debt [37].
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF SMALL FIRMS’ 
CAPITAL STRUCTURES
Relatively little research has been done on the capital structures of small 
firms, particularly in a multivariate context. Most such research has concen­
trated on the characteristics of the small firm itself. Leeth and Scott [23] 
investigated the use of secured borrowing. Using data from two samples of 
loans to small business, they found that the use of secured debt is associated 
with the age of the firm (their proxy for default probability), loan size, loan 
maturity, legal environment, economic conditions, and industry.^ Walker 
[40] generally found support for hypotheses relating firm characteristics to 
capital structure, but his small sample size (13 firms) precludes robust con­
clusions. Ou [29] divided his sample of small businesses into three catego­
ries: very small firms, traditional small businesses, and dynamic ventures. 
He found that financing differed among the categories.
Recent studies by Bates [7] and by Ando [2] incorporated not only 
characteristics of the firm but also characteristics of the owner Using a sam­
ple taken from the Characteristics of Business Owners database. Bates 
examined the dollar amount of debt financing used by small business own­
ers. He found that the owner's education, age, the dollar amount of equity 
capital, and whether the business was ongoing or a start-up affected dollar 
debt financing for whites. For blacks, education, the amount of equity cap­
ital, the owner's experience in a family-owned business, and whether the 
business was ongoing or a start-up affected dollar debt financing. He also
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found that blacks used less dollar debt than whites with the same qualifica­
tions (either because they chose to use less debt or because of credit discrim­
ination).
Using a sample of about 500 owners of established businesses in 1984, 
Ando performed regression analysis to test determinants of capital struc­
ture. At the 90% confidence level, she found the following to influence debt/ 
equity position significantly for established small businesses: the owner's 
business education, the age of the firm, the firm's size, the firm's growth 
rate, the firm's credit rating, the firm's initial debt position, and whether the 
firm had obtained an SBA loan.
With respect to ethnicity, Ando found that minority men who are 
American Indians, Eskimos, and Asian Indians (persons from India and 
Pakistan) used less debt, as did Asian women. Not found to affect debt posi­
tion were the amount of initial equity capital, minority status, and gender 
except as discussed above.
Bates' and Ando's studies are strong initial efforts in linking both busi­
ness and personal characteristics to debt/equity mix. Our study advances 
their research in several respects. First, like Ando, we concentrate on finan­
cial leverage (debt/equity mix), but we employ much larger samples than 
she did. Second, we control for the effects of industry, an important busi­
ness characteristic which has been found to be a significant factor affecting 
capital structure for large firms. Finally, we investigate in far more detail the 
relationship between the owner/manager's human capital and the firm's 
capital structure.
IV. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Hypotheses
In studies of the capital structures of large firms, the dependent vari­
able usually studied is the ratio of debt to total capitalization (or its equiva­
lent, debt/equity). This ratio is important for two reasons. First, debt/equity 
position represents an important choice in that it has substantial implica­
tions for the firm's level of risk and return. Second, while subject to con­
straints and costs imposed by the market, the firm has a reasonably wide 
choice of its debt/equity position; therefore, its debt/equity choice is impor­
tant evidence regarding the incentives to which the firm's managers 
respond.
Our research hypotheses concern the relationship between the ratio of 
debt to total capitalization and three sets of explanatory variables:
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1. variables which enable lenders to value the firm's human capital;
2. variables which represent the owner/manager's risk preferences and/ 
or credit discrimination by lenders; and
3. variables which capture the firm's business and operating 
attributes.
Our hypotheses regarding the first two of these sets of variables are 
based on Myers' Pecking Order Hypothesis [25] (referred to hereafter as the 
POH), a theory of capital structure choice with important application to 
small firms.^ In this view, firms finance their needs in hierarchical fashion, 
first using internal equity, followed by debt, and finally external equity. This 
ordering is caused by the effects of asymmetric information and agency 
problems on the returns required by providers of various sources of funds 
[19, 26]. For small businesses, asymmetry of information and agency prob­
lems between management and outside investors are more acute than for 
laige firms, making differences in costs between internal equity, debt, and 
external equity consequently greater Therefore, the hierarchical approach 
should have even more appeal to small firms than to large.
If Myers' POH holds for small firms, external equity will be extremely 
costly, and debt financing will be much preferred as a method of obtaining 
external funds. Given that the owner/manager's equity contribution is lim­
ited by his or her personal net worth, capital structure will depend to some 
extent on the amount of borrowing which lenders will grant on reasonable 
terms. This lending, in turn, will depend in part on how they value the firm's 
human capital, as this is a major determinant of the small firm's success.
Lenders will provide capital at lower required returns to firms where 
the perceived value of the owner's human capital is higher Consequently, 
variables which reveal the value of the owner's human capital should be 
determinants of capital structure. Values for these variables which indicate 
a greater potential for success should lead to more debt as a proportion of 
initial capital since, under the POH, debt is preferred for outside financing.
In addition to measures of the value of the firm's human capital, the 
owner/manager's personal characteristics (such as the amount of the man­
ager's other income, his or her gender, ethnicity, etc.) may influence capital 
structure choice. This influence may occur in two ways. First, personal char­
acteristics may affect the owner/manager's risk preferences and therefore 
the amount of debt he or she is willing to incur. Second, personal charac­
teristics of the loan applicant may influence the amount and/or cost of 
funds borrowed via gender or racial discrimination in lending.
Our final set of explanatory variables concerns the firm's business and 
operating attributes. There is substantial evidence in the large-firm litera­
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ture that certain of these attributes, such as the available of securable assets, 
lead to greater debt use.
Sample
Our sample has been extracted from the 1982 Characteristics of Busi­
ness Owners (CBO) database. This is a stratified sample of 125,000 small 
business owners collected in 1986 and reflective of business status as of 
1982 [38].^ The following firms were excluded from our sample:
a. Firms reporting no equity capitalization. There must be some equity capi­
talization to start a business. Removing these firms from the sample 
provides a reasonability check on the financial data reported by the 
firm.
b. Firms whose owner is not the original founder. This cutout centers around 
data reliability. We wanted data to be as reliable as possible, and sus­
pect that founders are more likely to have accurate information on 
the business's start-up capitalization than are subsequent owners.
c. Firms with yearly sales below $5,000. This cutout is to purge the data of 
firms which are so small that serious consideration of funding has 
probably not been undertaken.
d. Firms founded before 1980. Given that the CBO questionnaire was 
administered in 1986, it seems reasonable to include only recently- 
founded businesses, as these probably have the most reliable start-up 
data. To a great extent, this restriction also holds constant interest 
rates and tax regimes.
Multiple-owner firms were randomly assigned to one of the owners 
and that owner's personal characteristics were used to characterize the 
firm's ownership; other owners of the same business are excluded from the 
sample. (There are several possible approaches to the problem of multiple 
owners when there may be differences in race, gender, education, etc., but 
this approach seemed least likely to induce systematic bias.)
One important question in investigating the small firm's capital struc­
ture concerns the treatment of debt obtained from insiders (the owner, the 
owner's family and friends, etc.). Ang [3] refers to such debt as “quasi­
equity,” stating that for such borrowings, the legal rights of debt will not be 
enforced (also see Ou [30] for discussion of this issue). To address this prob­
lem, two subsamples were developed; one containing all firms, regardless 
of the source of debt financing, and one where all the firms' borrowings 
were solely from financial institutions.^ These cutouts and other data
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requirements resulted in sample sizes of 41,665 for the first subsample and 
7,588 for the second.
Measurement Issues
Data Encoding—The Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) data­
base is based on responses to a questionnaire. Our statistical analysis related 
a measure of debt/equity from this questionnaire to explanatory variables 
measuring the value of human capital, personal characteristics, and the 
firm's business/operating attributes. The CBO questionnaire required 
responses of three types: numerical responses, multiple-choice responses 
among alternative ranges of a num erical variable, and categorical 
responses. Responses of the first two types were treated as if data were con­
tinuous: for numerical responses, the actual numerical response was used, 
and for multiple-choice responses, the midpoint of each numerical range 
was used. (While a set of dummy variables could have been used to repre­
sent the later data, utilizing a single variable based on the midpoint of the 
range simplified estimation and interpretation.) For categorical data, 
dummy variables were used with a one indicating membership in the cate­
gory.
Dependent Variable—Our dependent variable was the ratio of business 
start-up debt to total capital. Responses to a multiple-choice question with 
eleven ranges of debt to total capitalization (i.e, none, 1-10%, 11-20%, etc.) 
were encoded based on the midpoints of these ranges. Therefore, this vari­
able can take on eleven values.
Measures of Human Capital—^The following variables were used to mea­
sure the value of the owner's human capital:
a. Owner's Age. Lenders may be willing to lend to older, more experi­
enced owner/managers at startup since there is likely to be less uncer­
tainty about their performance. Responses to a multi-choice question 
with six ranges of the owner's age were encoded based on the mid­
points of these ranges.®
b. Owner's Education. If education contributes to success in small busi­
ness, lenders should be willing to lend more to better educated 
owner/managers.® This continuous variable was measured as total 
years of education.
c. Owner’s Business Education. Ando found that this type of education 
was associated with greater debt. A dummy variable captured 
whether the owner had formal business education.
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d. Owner’s Family Business Experience. Coming from a family with small 
business experience may aid in small business success and increase 
loan availability. A dummy variable captured whether the owner's 
family had owned a small business.
e. Owner's Managerial Experience. Like other types of education and 
experience, managerial experience may cause lenders to place a 
higher value on the firm's human capital. Responses to a multi­
choice question with seven ranges of years of managerial experience 
were encoded based on the midpoints of these ranges.
f. Owner's Business Ownership Experience. Owner/managers who have 
previously owned a small business have, via the performance of this 
prior business, revealed a good deal about their competence. A 
dummy captured whether the owner had prior business ownership 
experience.
Measures of Other Personal Characteristics—Our second set of explana­
tory variables is intended to capture differences among owners due to these 
factors:
a. Percent of Owner's Income Expected from the Business. The higher the 
percent of income that the owner expects to derive from the small 
business, the lower is the diversification of the owner/manager's 
income stream, and the less debt is likely to be used (since the owner 
will be more risk averse due to this lack of diversification; see Ang 
[3]). However, there is a counterhypothesis: banks may prefer to lend 
when the firm is expected to provide a larger share of the owner's 
income, since the owner is more likely to concentrate on the affairs 
of the firm. To proxy for the fraction of income expected (at startup) 
to be derived from the business, we use the actual percent of income 
which the owner derived from the business, measured after the fact. 
Responses to a multiple-choice question with seven ranges of actual 
percent of income from the business were encoded based on the mid­
points of these ranges.
b. Owner's Marital Status. Married owners are more likely to have a sep­
arate income stream from their spouse, resulting in more financial 
diversification. Therefore, married owners are likely to use more 
debt.^^ A counterhypothesis is that married owners, because they 
may have two income streams, will have higher net worths and thus 
(under the POH) will substitute cheaper internal equity for debt. A 
set of three dummy variables captured whether the owner was mar­
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ried, divorced or separated, or a widow or widower. Never married 
was the excluded category.
c. Owner's Gender. Research conducted prior to the 1960s found differ­
ences in risk preference between males and females with females 
being more risk averse. However, more recent investigations includ­
ing studies using entrepreneurs as subjects [24] have found no such 
difference. Nonetheless, credit discrimination based on gender may 
exist, reducing the availability of borrowed funds to women. A vari­
able captured male/female. (One equals male.)
d. Owner's Ethnicity. Little research had been done on differences in risk- 
taking propensity by ethnicity; any such differences may influence 
the owner/manager's choice of capital structure. There also may also 
be credit discrimination based on ethnicity, and empirical evidence 
indicates that such discrimination in lending amounts and lending 
costs exists either because of owner's ethnicity or business location in 
a minority area [5, 12, 18]. This discrimination is primarily directed 
against black businesses and tends to decrease their debt ratios. How­
ever, the conventional wisdom is that minority firms may also have 
relatively little initial equity contribution because earnings and, con­
sequently, savings from the owner/manager are less than for owner/ 
managers of nonminority firms. This would tend to increase the debt 
ratio. We address these issues by employing measures of Hispanic/ 
nonhispanic and black/nonblack ethnicity. Two dummy variables 
captured Hispanic/nonhispanic and black/nonblack ethnicity. White 
was the excluded category.
Business and Operating Characteristics of the Firm—^The following vari­
ables were employed to capture these effects:
a. Industry. In prior empirical research on large firms, industry mem­
bership has been associated with capital structure choice [10, 35, 37]. 
Industry membership can proxy for a number of factors, including 
the securability of assets. To a great extent, industry membership 
captures business characteristics, a factor which Pettit and Singer cite 
as important in small-firm capital structure. A set of nine dummy 
variables captured m em bership in ten industry groups. The 
excluded category was Agricultural Services.
b. Expected Size. For larger firms, more information is available, and 
they may obtain financing in markets which are foreclosed to or 
extremely costly for smaller firms. Firm size has been used in several 
studies of capital structure [9, 30, 37] to capture these effects of mar-
Financing the Small Firm Start-up 25
ket a c c e s s . A s  in our proxy representing the percent of income 
expected to be derived from the business, we use actual size to proxy 
for expected size. Responses to a multiple-choice question with 10 
ranges of actual dollar sales were encoded based on the midpoints of 
these ranges.
c. Expected Profitability. Profitability has been used in prior studies of 
existing large and small firms and generally has been found to be 
negatively associated with debt use.^^ However, the usual test relates 
past profits to present capital structure, the premise being that firms 
have used accumulated profits in place of debt financing. Our 
study concerns start-up capital structures; there are no accumulated 
profits to supplant debt. In such a situation, if there is a pecking 
order making debt more expensive than internal equity, firms will 
only use debt financing if there is sufficient expected profitability to 
warrant the costlier funds; hence profits and start-up debt should be 
positively related. Our measure of expected profitability is actual net 
income before taxes divided by actual total capitalization. Both are 
measured as the midpoints of response ranges to multiple-choice 
questions (16 ranges for net income, nine ranges for total capitaliza­
tion).
It is important to note that for the percent of income expected to be 
derived from the business, expected sales, and expected profitability, we 
have used actiial outcomes to proxy for expectations at the time of startup; 
there are no expectational measures on the CBO database. Such a proce­
dure introduces an element of measurement error since actual outcomes 
may differ from the expectations under which startup capital structure 
plans were made. However, we felt these variables to be of sufficient impor­
tance to make this tradeoff advantageous.^^
V. RESULTS 
Sources of Debt
Readers may be interested in the sources of debt used by the firms in 
the CBO database. Of the firms in this database, the majority used only the 
owner's savings as initial capital [29]. For those firms who employed debt 
capital financing, many utilized multiple sources of borrowing; the largest 
single source of debt was the firm's bank, with borrowing from other mem­
bers of the family (“quasi-equity”) being the second most important source. 
A summary of sources of debt for firms in the CBO cl3.t3.l33.sc IS prescnteci in 
Table
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Table 1
Percents of Debt Borrowed from Various 
Sources for Firms in the CBO Database 
that UtiHzed Debt Financing at Start-Up
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Owner’s Ethnicity
Borrowing Sources
Family Friends Government Seller Bank
White— Males 23.7% 6.7% 1.6% 7.7% 60.3%
White— Females 27.6% 6.6% 1.7% 7.2% 56.9%
Hispanic 30.4% 11.0% 3.0% 7.7% 47.8%
Black 22.8% 11.4% 5.5% 4.6%
Other Minority 30.3% 16.8% 2.1% 12.5% 38.3%
Notes: Abstracted from Ou [29], Table 6.
All Firms
We related the explanatory variables to debt/capitalization via OLS 
regression. Because data on our dependent variable are categorical (11 
levels), we also considered two alternative methodologies: Tobit and Pro­
bit. While Tobit has been applied in situations w^here the dependent vari­
able is limited, Kmenta [21] and Amemiya [1] have argued that this 
method is most advantageous when values of the dependent variable out­
side a specific range are omitted or lost. Perhaps a more appropriate alter­
native for the situation at hand is ordered Probit analysis, recently 
demonstrated in a financial context by Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay [17]. 
This computationally intensive technique entails the joint estimation of 
multiple Probit models. Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay contrast estimates 
from this technique with those from OLS. They find that discreteness of 
the dependent variable does matter in that the standard errors of OLS 
estimates are generally larger, leading to fewer significant results. We 
chose OLS over Probit primarily for simplicity in computation and inter­
pretation, accepting more-conservative hypothesis tests as a penalty for 
these advantages.
OLS results for the first subsample, which includes firms regardless of 
their source of borrowing, are presented in Table 2.
We expected that lenders would be more willing to lend to older 
business owners because they would have less uncertainty regarding the 
owner's competence. However, while owner's age is statistically significant, 
its estimated coefficient has an unexpected sign; it is negatively related to 
debt position. There are several possible explanations for this result:
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Table 2
Results of Analysis via OLS Regression; 
Dependent Variable is Debt/Total Capitalization 
(Includes All Firms Regardless of Source of Debt)
Explanatory Variable
Estimated
Coefficient t Statistic
Intercept 0.1931 12.312***
Group 1: Variables Measuring Owner's Education or Experience
Age -0.0017 -10.936***
Years of Education -0.0017 -2.855**
Business Education 0.0019 0.512
Business Ownership Experience 0.0260 5.955***
Managerial Experience 0.0001 0.448
Family Business Experience 0.0163 3.424***
Group 2: Variables Measuring Risk Preference or Discrimination
Percent of Income Expected from Business 0.1201 28.858***
Marital Status (excluded class: Never Married)
Married 0.0601 9.238***
Divorced or Separated 0.0378 4.433***
WidowAVidower 0.0432 3.222**
Gender (Male = 1, Female = 0) 0.0357 9.281***
Ethnicity
Hispanic -0.0041 -0.958
Black -0.0323 -6.849***
Group 3: Variables Representing Business and Operating Attributes
Industry Dummy Variables 
(excluded group: Agricultural Services)
Mining -0.0055 -0.300
Construction -0.0836 -7.133***
Manufacturing -0.0321 -2.690**
Transportation, Utilities 0.1354 11.097***
Wholesale Trade -0.0193 -1.292
Retail Trade 0.0138 1.339
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate -0.0646 -5.376***
Other Services 0.0012 0.194
All Other -0.0324 -2.788**
Expected Sales Size 3.287x10'® 8.480***
Expected Profitability 0.1078 12.229***
Notes: The sample size is 41,665. The adjusted is .0512. F for this equation is 94.774,
which is significant at the 0.0001 level. An *, **, or *** next to a / statistic indicates that 
the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 
levels respectively.
1. Older owners may have larger net worths, and may substitute this 
internal equity for debt financing (the POH); there is no measure of 
the owner's net worth on the CBO database to control for this effect.
2. Older owners may be more risk averse since their investment time 
horizon is shorter
3. Lenders may be reluctant to lend to older people, despite informa­
tional advantages, because of their shorter expected time of owner­
ship.
4. The measure of age we used may not be the proper operationaliza­
tion to capture the relationship.
The variables which measure other aspects of experience or education 
present a mixed picture. Estimated coefficients for business ownership 
experience and family business experience are statistically significant and 
have the expected sign, but the coefficient for years of education is signifi­
cant and unexpectedly signed. Business education and management expe­
rience are not statistically significant. This is contrary to Ando's [2] result for 
established small businesses; she found that owners with business education 
had significantly more debt in their firms' capital structures. While lenders 
may consider education in lending to established business but not to star­
tups, it is also possible that our measures simply do not capture the dimen­
sions of education and experience which are considered by lenders in 
making such decisions. Multicollinearity among the education and experi­
ence variables may also play a part.
Coefficients for variables portraying risk preference and/or credit dis­
crimination tell a different story. We find a very strong positive association 
between the expected percent of income derived from the firm and the pro­
portion of debt financing. This finding supports the idea that lenders favor 
firms which are expected to be the primary sources of income for their own­
ers, and thus probably their main occupations. The proportion of debt used 
is significantly higher for married owners than for never-marrieds. This 
result is consistent with prior empirical work [39] and with the hypothesis 
that lenders favor owners with diversified sources of income. Interestingly, 
we also find that significantly more debt is used by divorced or separated 
owners and by widows and widowers than by those owners who have never 
been married. This may indicate that lenders discriminate against the 
never-married. It is not due to differences in age since age is among the 
variables controlled in our research design.
We find that male owners utilize significantly more debt than female 
owners. There are at least two possible explanations for this result. Female 
owners may be more risk averse, and therefore choose to employ less finan-
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cial leverage in the capital structures of their firms. The other possibility is 
that there may be discrimination in lending against female owners relative 
to otherwise-equivalent male owners. Lending discrimination would result 
in lower levels of debt in females' capital structures by either limiting the 
amount of debt financing available or making debt a less attractive financ­
ing alternative due to higher cost. A similar result occurs for black versus 
white owners (black owners use less debt than white owners), perhaps for 
the same reasons. There is no difference in debt use between Hispanic ver­
sus white owners. These results for ethnicity and gender contrast with 
Ando's research, which in general did not find ethnicity or gender to be 
important capital structure determinants, but are in keeping with other 
empirical research [5, 7, 12, 18, 39].
Similar to Leeth and Scott's [23] results regarding secured lending to 
small firms and results in the large-firm literature, we find industry to be an 
important factor in debt position. Of the nine industry dummies, the esti­
mated coefficients of five are statistically significant relative to the excluded 
group (Agricultural Services). By far the highest proportion of debt occurs 
for firms in the “Transportation and Utilities” category which includes 
trucking, taxi, and similar companies with highly securable assets (vehi­
cles). Small firms in the construction, manufacturing, finance, and “other” 
groups had significantly lower startup financial leverage than the excluded 
group.
A nother factor which affects startup leverage in this sample is 
expected size (as measured by actual sales). Firms that are expected to be 
larger are able to raise significantly more debt as a proportion of total fund­
ing than are smaller firms. The positive relationship between debt position 
and firm size is in line with Ando's results.
Likewise, expected profitability is a powerful influence on debt posi­
tion. Firms which are expected to have greater debt-servicing capacity uti­
lize higher volumes of debt at startup either because they have more 
profitable projects available and borrow to finance these projects or because 
lenders will lend to them on more advantageous terms.
Firms Borrowing Only From Financial Institutions
These results are presented in Table 3. Differences between results for 
this sample and the first may illustrate differences in lending criteria 
employed by all lenders (including those providing quasi-equity) versus the 
criteria employed by financial institutions alone. An alternative explanation 
is that owners who borrow from insiders are in some ways different from 
those who borrow from financial institutions.
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Table 3
Results of Analysis via OLS Regression:
Dependent Variable is Debt/Total Capitalization 
(Includes Firms which Borrow Only from Financial Institutions)
Explanatory Variable
Estimated
Coefficient t Statistic
Intercept 0.6702 20.306***
Group 1: Variables Measuring Owner's Education or Experience
Age -0.0031 -9.032***
Years of Education -0.0006 -0.476
Business Education -0.0020 -0.253
Business Ownership Experience 0.0032 0.362
Managerial Experience -0.0003 -0.726
Family Business Experience -0.0183 -1.847
Group 2: \hriables Measuring Risk Preference or Discrimination
Percent o f Income Expected from Business 0.0320 3.630***
Marital Status (excluded class: Never Married)
Married 0.0353 2.149*
Divorced or Separated 0.0268 1.287
Widow/Mdower 0.0401 1.275
Gender (Male = I, Female = 0) -0.0038 -0.450
Ethnicity
Hispanic 0.0033 0.368
Black -0.0343 -3.366***
Group 3: Variables Representing Business and Operating Attributes
Industry Dummy Variables 
(excluded group: Agricultural Services)
Mining 0.0634 1.865
Construction -0.0100 -0.429
Manufacturing 0.0158 0.651
Transportation, Utilities 0.0885 4.032***
Wholesale Trade 0.0194 0.615
Retail Trade 0.0505 2.507*
finance, Insurance, Real Estate 0.0268 1.063
Other Services 0.0732 3.679***
All Other 0.0396 1.691
Expected Sales Size 1.508x10'^ 0.128
Expected Profitability 0.2692 9.802***
Notes: The sample size is 7,588. The adjusted F? is 0.0336. Ffor this equation is 12.007,
which is significant at the 0.0001 level. An *, **, or *** next to a <-statistic indicates that 
the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001
levels respectively.
We find far fewer statistically significant associations than for the prior 
sample. Age is again significant but again has an unexpected negative sign. 
Unlike the prior sample, none of the coefficients for education or experi­
ence variables are significant. Among the risk preference/discrimination 
variables, expected percent of income from the business is again significant 
and positively signed. In this regression, marrieds have higher startup debt 
than never marrieds but divorced or separated and widows and widowers 
do not. There is no difference betvveen the startup debt/equity positions of 
firms owned by males and females. However, blacks still use significantly 
less debt at startup than do whites.
Among the industry classifications, transportation and utilities, retail­
ers, and other services now have significantly different debt ratios than the 
excluded group; the later two groups were not significantly different from 
the excluded group in the prior sample. In this sample, higher expected 
sales volumes are not associated with more debt. However, as before, firms 
with higher expected profitability employ more debt at startup.
VI. SUMMARY AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
What characteristics of the firm and its owner/manager influence its startup 
capital structure? Age appears to be negatively associated with debt use, 
regardless of the source of borrowing. We do not find consistent support for 
the owner's other educational and experience-based characteristics as 
determinants of startup financial leverage, though some appear to be 
important to insider lenders (but not to financial institutions). However, we 
do find substantial support for the percent of income expected firom the 
business, marital status, and ethnicity as factors affecting start-up capital 
structure for all types of lenders. The significance of these characteristics 
could arise from differences in owner's risk preference, differences in the 
owner's net worth, or discrimination in credit markets. We also find that sev­
eral business and operating characteristics of the firm are important in 
obtaining initial debt financing. Firms in the transportation and utility 
industry category and firms with higher expected profits utilize more debt.
There is much left to do. While our tests of hypotheses produce several 
strongly significant results, our model explains only five or three percent 
(depending on the sample) of the cross-sectional variation in startup capital 
structure. Idiosyncratic factors in the lender's decision regarding small 
business loan appUcations (such as the lender's assessment of the quality of 
the apphcant's business plan) limit the ability of any model to capture small 
firms' startup debt positions. However, there are undoubtedly important 
factors which influence initial debt/capitalization and which we have not
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included in our model because proxies are not available in the CBO data­
base. Chief among these is the owner's net worth which is the dominant 
variable in determining the initial equity investment according to the Peck­
ing Order Hypothesis. Investigation of these and other factors are areas for 
future research.
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NOTES
1. Empirical comparisons o f risk aversion between small business owners and other 
groups have produced mixed results. See, for example, Brockhaus [11] and Sexton and 
Kent [34].
2. Indeed, the value of his or her own human capital may not even be known by the 
business owner; see Bates [6].
3. Instead of paying these higher required returns, the small firm may agree to conditions 
of investment or borrowing which tend to ameliorate these agency problems such as 
stringent restrictions on managerial decisions or secured borrowing [23, 31]. However, 
these conditions impose other costs on the firm.
4. Other less recent studies of secured borrowing include Glassman and Struck [16] and 
the National Federation of Independent Business [27].
5. For other approaches to modeling the capital structure choice of the small firm, see 
Evans and Jovanovic [14] and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson [15].
6. The advantage of this database is its huge size. The major disadvantage is cost. This 
database is not publicly accessible. To use it, the researcher enters into a contract with 
the Bureau of Census and pays for access; our costs were several hundred dollars for 
each statistical procedure performed. These costs severely limit exploratory data 
analysis, preliminary checking o f variable correlations and distributions, and 
experimentation with variable encodings and functional forms.
7. This procedure follows Bates [6, 7].
8. The age variable on the CBO database is the owner's age as of December 31, 1982. 
Combined with the criteria that firms must have been started during 1980-1982 to be 
included in the sample, this creates a small measurement error in the owner's age at 
start-up for some firms. For firms started in 1982, the reported age is correct, but the 
reported age is one year (on average) too high for businesses started in 1981 and two 
years two high for businesses started in 1980. The importance of this measurement 
error should be considered in light of the values of the age variable itself which range 
from 20 to 70.
9. See Bates [6] for discussion of the relationship between bank lending and education. 
Bates finds a positive relationship between owner education and small business 
longevity
10. Partial support for this hypothesis comes from prior research on sources o f start-up 
capitalization which indicated that married women utihze substantially more bank debt 
in their start-up capital structure than do unmarried women [39].
11. Many female small business owners believe that they are discriminated against by 
lending institutions [8, 33, 42]. Such discrimination may explain the prior empirical 
result that, in general, women employ slightly less bank borrowing as a proportion of 
their start-up capital structure [39].
12. It should be noted that this conventional view is not supported by recent empirical 
research [18], which did not find such differences in the net worths between black and 
white business owners at startup.
13. For discussion of changes in types of financing in the context of a growing firm, see 
Walker [41]. Also, as the firm grows, changes in managerial behavior, including  
increased risk aversion, may occur [36], which also influence capital structure choice.
14. See Baskin [4] for a literature review; this is evidence in support o f the POH. In 
addition to these tests of association, survey evidence in support of the POH has been 
found in the capital structure policies employed by managers o f large (Pinegar and 
Wilbricht [32]) and small (Norton [28]) firms.
15. See Krishnan, Ramanujam, and Rao [22] for discussion o f this point.
16. In a recent paper, Keasey and McGuiness [20] discuss this argument in detail and find 
empirical evidence that small start-up firms require greater returns firom initial debt 
financing than from internal equity financing. As an alternative explanation for their 
empirical results, they postulate that banks may lend only to firms whose potential 
profitability is greater.
17. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for comments which lead to our clarification 
of this issue.
18. See Ou [29] and Bates [7] for additional discussion of sources of debt financing for 
firms in the CBO database.
19. These R^s are somewhat lower than those of other researchers. Ando's regression 
explaining debt/equity for ongoing firms has an R^  o f 0.31 [2, pp. 88-89]. However, by 
far the largest contribution to the equation's explanatory power comes from the firm's 
debt ratio at startup, a variable not appropriate when investigating start-up capital 
structure as we do. Elliehausen and Wolken [13], using two samples extracted fi-om the 
National Survey of Small Business Finances, get R^s o f 0.15 and 0.05 for equations 
similar to ours.
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